Complementary-asset dependence is a switching barrier that arises when replacing a product also means replacing what was built around it: the applications that run on it, the files in its format, the supplies it takes or the procedures staff learned. Those extra costs keep customers in place even when a rival is better.
Also calledapplications barrier to entryecosystem lock-in
How Complementary-asset dependence works
Lost complements push the real price of switching well above the price of the replacement, so customers stay even when a rival is better on its own. Windows is the classic case. Court findings in 1999 counted over 70,000 Windows applications, and users would not move to the Mac even after a sustained price rise because leaving meant replacing applications, files and skills. IBM's OS/2 stalled at about 2,500 applications.
The barrier lasts only while the complements can't move. Adapters, open standards and data portability let them travel to a rival, which weakens the lock without any change to the incumbent's product.
Windows hosts applicationsOver 70,000 applications by 1999
User weighs switchingThe Mac or OS/2 offers far fewer
Complements would breakApplications, files and skills need replacing
User staysEven after a sustained price rise
Why PC users stayed with Windows in the 1990s: leaving meant replacing the applications, files and skills built around it.
How companies won with Complementary-asset dependence
From the win chains in Strategy Canon case studies: what the winner did, and what its rival did at the same step.
vs. Apple · 1994–99
Microsoft
Applications barrier to entry
What it did
Over 70,000 Windows applications; switching meant replacing applications, files and skills, so users would not move even after a sustained price rise
Apple
By 1997 Apple depended on Microsoft's Mac Office to survive: the court found that ending Mac Office would read as 'Apple's death notice'