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Ultimate Software

Ultimate moved payroll into a hosted service, then made implementation and a broader HR suite part of the sale.

What shaped Ultimate Software

  1. 1 · 2002 to 2004Move the operating burden out of the customer’s officeThe 2004 filing described Intersourcing as a way to avoid buying and maintaining the hardware behind UltiPro. US6 US1Subscription Pricing
  2. 2 · 2005 to 2018Make payroll work, then sell more HR functionsBy 2018, Ultimate sold a broad HR and payroll suite through direct sales teams, charged launch fees and offered additional products on recurring terms. US1 US2Multi-Product
  3. 3 · 2018 to 2019The system of record still left employee-service workUltimate acquired PeopleDoc in 2018. US1 US4

Arena: Market Conditions Before Ultimate Software

Payroll and human capital management · United States · Employers running payroll and HR · 2002

High setup and upkeep costs

Employers using installed payroll and HR applications had to arrange hardware, maintenance, backups and software changes as well as run payroll. Moving to a hosted service could remove some of that work, but the employer still needed accurate employee records and a reliable transition. Employers could operate the infrastructure themselves or pay a supplier to run it. US6

How each step happened

Step 1 of 3 · 2002 to 2004

Move the operating burden out of the customer’s office

The 2004 filing described Intersourcing as a way to avoid buying and maintaining the hardware behind UltiPro. New-unit sales had shifted to 65% hosting in the first quarter of 2004, while license sales still continued. The hosted contracts generally began with a 24-month term. US6

Hosting changed both the customer’s job and Ultimate’s revenue model. The employer could buy an operating service instead of maintaining an application installation. Ultimate took responsibility for the infrastructure and earned recurring fees, while retaining a license route during the transition.

Hosting was a growing industry model. These disclosures show Ultimate’s implemented transition and buyer uptake; they do not establish that it invented SaaS or alone could deliver reliable payroll.

Rivals The concrete alternative was a licensed installation maintained for the customer. The unit-sales mix demonstrates movement toward hosting, without proving that every license customer migrated.

Subscription Pricing

Step 2 of 3 · 2005 to 2018

Make payroll work, then sell more HR functions

By 2018, Ultimate sold a broad HR and payroll suite through direct sales teams, charged launch fees and offered additional products on recurring terms. Services costs exceeded services revenue by about $15 million. Recurring revenue retention was 96%, and total revenue reached $1.14 billion. US1

Implementation was part of making the subscription useful. Once payroll and employee records were working, a customer could add talent or time functions around that base. Maintaining an expensive service operation is consistent with protecting recurring accounts, although the filing does not measure the incremental return on that spending.

Retention is measured in recurring revenue and is not a customer-count retention rate. Scherr’s People First explanation comes from a sponsored interview; it is a management hypothesis about service quality, not independent proof that culture caused retention. US2

Rivals Customers could retain an installed payroll product and buy separate HR tools, or select another hosted suite. A connected implementation reduced the number of projects needed to expand within UltiPro, but competitors could offer similar consolidation.

Multi-Product

Step 3 of 3 · 2018 to 2019

The system of record still left employee-service work

Ultimate acquired PeopleDoc in 2018. Bersin placed this kind of employee-service product above established HR systems of record, where employees still had to navigate fragmented requests and information. Mueller’s 2019 conference report described further mobile and technology work, including a replacement stack still under development. The acquisition of Ultimate closed in May 2019. US1 US4 US5 US3

A broad HR database did not finish every employee task. PeopleDoc added another route to expand the account by handling documents and service requests. The analyst reports also show the continuing investment needed to keep an established suite useful as expectations changed.

The acquisition is a completed product investment. The reports do not establish realized cross-selling returns, and planned technology refreshes are not treated as capabilities already delivered to customers.

Rivals An employer could add a separate employee-experience or service product over its existing HR system. Owning PeopleDoc gave Ultimate that capability, but did not eliminate those alternatives.

Key dates

  1. 2002Intersourcing offered UltiPro through hosted delivery. US6
  2. 2004Hosting represented 65% of first-quarter new-unit sales. US6
  3. 2012-04-24In a sponsored interview, Scherr linked employee treatment to customer service. US2
  4. 2018Ultimate reported $1.14 billion revenue and 96% recurring revenue retention. US1
  5. 2018Ultimate expanded into employee documents and HR-service delivery. US1
  6. 2019-05-03The investor group completed its approximately $11 billion purchase of Ultimate. US3

Sources

Oldest first.

  1. US6 First quarter 2004 report. Ultimate Software / SEC · 2004-05-07 Primary disclosure
  2. US2 Scott Scherr on the foundation of a successful business. HR Bartender / Sharlyn Lauby · 2012-04-24 Founder interview
  3. US5 The employee experience platform: a new category arrives. Josh Bersin · 2019-02-15 Outside analysis
  4. US1 2018 annual report. Ultimate Software / SEC · 2019-03-01 Primary disclosure
  5. US4 Ultimate Software Connections conference report. Constellation Research / Holger Mueller · 2019-05-01 Outside analysis
  6. US3 Ultimate Software completes acquisition agreement. Ultimate Software / SEC · 2019-05-03 Primary disclosure